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COMMENTS.
SoME CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF STATE RECOVERY Acts.-Concurrently
with his plea for an extension of the National Industrial Recovery Act,1
President Roosevelt has indicated that he is desirous that the states should
enact recovery acts 2 in support of the federal statute. While it seems that if
3
the federal act is upheld, despite Hammer v. Dagethart,
and if the court gives
a broad application to the rule enunciated in the Shreveport Case,4 the commercial and industrial field will become almost exclusively one of federal
jurisdiction, still certain businesses must remain solely within the control of the
states. 5 The need for a centralized agency to combat present economic prob1. See N. Y. World-Telegram, Feb. 20, 1935, at 1; N. Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1935, at 1.
2. See note 80, infra for a list of state acts.
3. 247 U. S. 251 (1918), denying to Congress the power to prohibit the transportation
in interstate commerce, goods which are the result of child production. It is the language
of the Court which places the -obstacle in the path of the constitutionality of the National
Industrial Recovery Act. At page 272 the Court said that over "interstate transportation,
or its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress is ample, but the prodtiction of articles,
intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation." Possible grounds of
distinction have been suggested on the theory that the National Act is not prohibitory but
attempts to increase the volume of goods flowing in interstate commerce; that the emergency is bringing production and commerce closer together; that the Act will put men
back to work; that in putting men to work it increases buying power; that with the increase of buying power the flow of goods in interstate commerce will be increased and
therefore in order to regulate and promote interstate commerce Congres must extend its
control into the producing sources. See Hagan, The Elasticity of the Fedtal Constitution
(1934) 20 VA. L. Rv. 391; Russell, The New Deal and the Constitution (1934) 28 Ir.r. L.
R-v. 720; Black, The Commerce Clause and the New Deal (1935) 20 Colz. L. Q. 169;
Comment (1933) 47 HAxv. L. Rav. 85; Cousens, The Use of the Federal Interstate Commerce Power to Regulate Matters Within the States (1934) 21 VA. L. Rnv. 51. But see
Smith, The National Industrial Recovery Act: Is it Constitutional? (lAly 1934) 20 A. B
A. J. 273, 318, to the effect that the attempted exercise is beyond the scope of Congressional
powers and contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
4. Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914), holding that when
interstate and intrastate transactions are so related that the government of one involves a
control of the other, Congress is to prescribe the final and dominant rule. Accord: Ill.
Cent. R. R. Co. v. Public Util. Comm. 245 U. S. 493 (1918); Wis. R. R. Com. v. C. B.
& Q. R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 (1922);
United States v. Schussler, 7 F. Supp. 123 (N. D. Ill.
1934); cf. Seelig, Inc., v? Baldwin,
55 Sup. Ct. 497 (1935).
5. This is forcibly evidenced in those cases where control is denied to the Secretary of
Agriculture, proceeding under the Agricultural Adjustment Act [48 STAT. 34 (1933), 7 U. S.
C. Supp. VII § 8 (1934)] in his attempts to regulate milk production. The Act gives him
power to issue licenses permitting processors and associations to engage in the handling in
the current of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product
thereof and competing commodity or product thereof. The licensing power was expressly
denied in the following cases on the ground that the business was wholly intrastate: United
States v. Nuendorff, 8 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Iowa 1934) ; United States v. Greenwood Dairy
Farms Inc., 8 F. Supp. 398 (D. C. Ind. 1934); Douglas v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 379 (W. D.
1934), where control
Okla. 1934); cf. United States v. Schussler, 7 .F. Supp. 123 (N. D. Ill.
was upheld because the interstate and intrastate milk business was so commingled that
effective interstate supervision also required intrastate regulation.
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lems is apparent,8 but it is still doubtful whether the exigencies of the situation
will influence the Court to such an extent as to result in the tempering of
accepted political concepts involving the sovereignties of our dual form of
government.7 The "Hot Oil" case 8 may be prophetic; perhaps just as much a
warning against the loooseness of the statute as an indication of the suspicion
of the Supreme Court that the scope of the act is not within the field of federal
control. A refusal by the Supreme Court to uphold the National Industrial
Recovery Act will in turn defeat the purpose of the state recovery acts enacted
to lend uniformity to the scheme of the federal act. However, as a supplement
to a federal act, assumed to be valid, the state acts assume importance because
of their attempts to cover fields which are concededly beyond federal control.
While the federal act is dependent upon a broad interpretation of implied
powers incident to the grant delegated to the federal government over matters
involving interstate commerce, 9 the jurisdiction of the states will depend upon
the scope of the police power, 10 a nebulous concept, which has broadened in
judicial forums1 ' during the past year concurrently with the attempts by
Congress to broaden federal powers.
Police Power in General
Police power, in its broadest concept, is the power of a sovereign to protect
and promote the general welfare.' 2 In the nature of things, it is probably as
old as government itself.' 3 Identified with the maxim Sic utere luo ut alienum
non laedas in English common law, 4 the concept was not unknown to the early
colonies and xeferences to it are found in the "Federalist" and at the Constitutional Convention.' 5 The protection afforded by the Constitution to individual rights as against arbitrary governmental action, requires that some
attempt be made to classify the power in view of constitutional limitations.
An examination of the concept in the light of the political theories prevalent
during the period when the Constitution was adopted, confuses rather than
aids in any attempt to divine its scope.' 0 Since the formation of our dual
6. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 443 (1935).
7. See notes 17, 18, 19 infra.
8. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), infra p. 341.
9. U. S. Coxsr. art. 1 § 8. "Congress shall have power to ... regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. . .
10. See note 20, infra.
11. The police power has been given a relatively broad application in Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934) and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. $02
(1934). See Comment (1935) 4 FoDmAm L. REv. 73.
12.

MOTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926)

300.

13. See JENKS, THE STATE AND TiE NATION (1919) 30-32, for a discusion of the historic
origin of this power.
14. The classification of the police power concept as a distinct governmental power
originated in the seventeenth century with the rise of the various theories concerning
sovereignty. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926) 300-301.
15. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS Or THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911) 629-632.
16. CoKE's INSTITUTES AND COMMENTARES ON LITTLETON, setting forth his theory of the
limitation upon the sovereign power, and LocxE's Two TREATIsES ON GOVERNMENT, enundating the social compact, enjoyed an important place in the colonial libraries. MoTT,
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form of government is the approximation to the ideal of a sovereign people,
resort must be had to theory to classify the police power concept and to
round out the ideal. The powers of the federal and state governments are
the expressions of the sovereignty of the people;' 7 the scope of the federal
powers being limited to the field designated in the Federal Constitution, and
subject to the prohibitions contained therein. The scope of the states' powers is
plenary' s except as limited by express prohibitions appearing in the Federal

and State Constitutions. In theory constitutional limitations constitute restrictions upon the sovereignty of the people as a group in favor of the protection

of the individual; protection afforded to a minority against the will of a
dominant majority as theoretically represented by the legislatures.

°

There-

fore, in the determination of the extent of the state police power, the issue
resolves itself into a clash between these sovereign powers and constitutional

limitations. The issue has been for the courts, and in the course of a century
and a half of judicial interpretation the concept has been recognized as the
power inherent in a government to enact, within constitutional limitations, laws
designed to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of
society. 0 However, cases involving business regulation relative to the promotion of the public health, safety and morals offer little aid as precedent in

relation to the constitutionality 2 ' of the state recovery acts. The validity of

DuE PRocass oF LAw (1926) 89. For a recognition of the social compact theory as underlying the present form of government, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 385, 388 (1798); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U. S. 627, 655-656 (1829) ; Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457, 582 (1870) ;
Oslow v. Nicholson, 80 U. S. 654, 662 (1871); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U. S. 610, 623 (1872).
However, BLAcxsou'c s ConaN-TArms with his exaltation of the sovereign power, also
enjoyed wide circulation in the colonial period. See Corwin, The "Higher Low" Bachground of American Constitutional Law (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 365, 407.
17. "The people of the state, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to
all the rights which formerly belonged to the king by his prerogative. Through the
medium of their legislatures they may exercise all the powers which previous to the
revolution could have been exercised by the king alone, or by him in conjunction with his
parliament; subject only to those restrictions which have been imposed by the constitution
of the states or the United States.' Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 20 (N. Y. 1829). See
Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 U. S. 53 (1795); Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 385, 387388 (1798); Campbell's Case, 2 Bland's Ch. 209, 20 Am. Dec. 360, 373 (Did. 1829).
18. The belief that state governments were governments of delegated powers as in the
case of the federal government, deriving their powers from the state constitutions was expressed in Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 385, 386 (1798). But that view has been rejected and
the accepted doctrine now is that the power of the states is plenary subject only to constitutional limitations. See Railroad Company v. County of Otoe, 83 U. S. 667, 672, 673
(1872); People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 400 (1871).
19. See Corwin, supra note 16, at 407.
20. This is the classic definition set out in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Atiss. 53, 85
(1851). See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 290 U. S. 398 (1934) for an exhaustive
examination of the police power concept. Specific applications of the principles are: Texas
& New Orleans R. R. Co. v. MAller, 221 U. S. 408 (1910) (public safety); Fertilizing Co.
v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 (1878) (public health) ; Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25 (1877)
(public morals).
21. In order to justify a police power statute as a public health or public moral or
public safety measure, it must be shown that there is a causal connection between the
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these acts will probably depend upon whether such regulation of business is
within the broad concept of regulation for the general welfare.
Police Power-Regulation of Business
Statutes regulatihig prices of commodities and hours and wages of employ-

ment were passed during the fourteenth, sixteenth and eighteenth centuries In
England, remaining in force until 1825.22 The colonial legislatures prior to
the adoption of the Constitution, at the instigation of the Confederation passed
price fixing statutes setting maximum prices on sale of commodities. 23 Impracticability of enforcement, however, led to immediate repeal. 24 Although
the Constitution was framed immediately following this period, no attempt to
limit this price fixing power appears although the power of the state to interfere
with existing contracts was expressly prohibited. 25 Since the due process
clause in the Constitution was a restriction only upon the federal government,
constitutional limitations, if any, upon the price-fixing exercise of the police
power prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment2 0 must be found in
the due process clauses of the state constitutions.2 7
The period immediately following the adoption of the Constitution and until
after the Civil War is practically devoid of state interference with business.
Dominating this period from a political viewpoint, is the clash between the
regulation and the health or the morals or safety of the public. However, the argument
that the economic depression has affected the morals of the people, might be found to be
too illusory by the courts. In the following cases the regulation of hours by statute was
not sustained because the courts maintained that there was no connection between the
regulation and the health of those employed: Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905);
United States v. Northern Commercial Co., 6 Alaska 94 (1918) (statute limited to eight
hours the employment of all wage earners); State v. Henry, 25 P. (2d) 204 (N. Mex.
1933) (statute prohibiting labor of male employees in mercantile establishments to eight
hours, held void); Saiville v. Corliss, 46 Utah 495 (1915) (regulating working hours of
employees of mercantile establishments in cities of over ten thousand population, void).
These cases implied that the law may only be upheld where there is imminent danger to
health. Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908); see Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U. S. 525, 567 (1923).
22. 23 Edw. III, c. 6 (1349); 5 Eliz., Cap. IV (1563); 18 Eliz., Cap. III (1576); 31
Geo. II, c. 29 (1758). See 2 HoLDswoRTH, HiSTORY OF ENGL H LAW (3d ed. 1927) 469,
where it is stated that the "old law was founded upon the view that it was for the state
to regulate the conditions of trade. All the medieval statutes dealing wtih commercial
matters rest upon this basis."
23. See Comment (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 838, 839 n. 5, citing colonial statutes which
regulated the prices of commodities during the Revolutionary War: e.g., N. Y. Laws 1778,
c. 34 entitled "An Act to Regulate the wages mechanicks and labourers, the price of goods.
. . . Thirdly: That all kinds of American manufactures, and internal produce not particularly mentioned and regulated by the said convention be estimated at rates not exceeding seventy-five per centum advance from the prices they were usually sold at... "
24. See N. Y. Laws 1778, c. 2 (2d Sess.), indicating that the act was repealed because
it could not be effectively enforced.
25. See Comment (1935) 4 FoRom= L. REv. 73, 74.
26. This amendment was not adopted until 1868.
27. See MorT, DuE PROcESs OF LAW (1926) 80 n. 28, showing that from 1780 to 1840
seventy-five per cent of the states had due process clauses in their constitutions.
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respective powers of the states and the federal government; from an economic
standpoint, it represents the expansion of commerce and business and the
breaking down of the western frontier. Protectionist tariffs provide governmental stimuli to domestic industries, and there is also present, whether consciously or not, a laissez-faire attitude toward business. - However, whatever
regulation was attempted during this period was upheld as a valid exercise of
the police power. In 1841 in the decision of Mobile v. Yuille, the Alabama
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance of Mobile which fixed the price of bread,
maintaining that although there can be no general restraint of trade, such restraint may be upheld if it be "for the good of the inhabitants. "' '
However,
even if the power were questioned, it does not seem likely that the courts could
have found an express constitutional prohibition. Due process, although in
the state constitutions in various forms, was identified at this time with the
question of procedure and not as a substantive limitation upon state powers-"O
It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that due process received
any recognition as a substantive limitation upon the powers of a state.P' In
1868, with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 to the Federal Constitution, due process became a federal limitation upon state powers. The first
judicial interpretation of this clause indicated that it was not a substantive
limitation upon state powers but was designed to protect and guarantee to the
28. This period is outstanding for its many political and sectional classes: states rights
adherents versus those in favor of a strong federal government; the triangular dash among
the industrial capitalistic East, the planting and land-holding South and the agrarian West;
the disputes between the South and the East over the protectionist tariffs; the general
feeling of hostility toward the privately-owned United States bank in the agrarian West.
Important, however, is the laissez faire attitude which dominated the Democratic Party.
The political creed of the party was an opposition to the tariff, the bank, and any interference with the domestic institutions of the states which furnished the labor supply of the
southern planters. Likewise, the expansion of business, with consequent employment, was
the best brief in favor of non-governmental interference. See Bn.nD sx%-.BE=, T=m Rism
or AnrucAN CrILZTioN (1930) 628-724; Pwx, Tim JAcrsoNIAZ. ErocrI (1899) for a
discussion of national politics during this period; HuNmr, Jom C. CArmoun (1903) for a
valuable description of governmental theories during this period.
29. 3 Ala. 137 (1841); cf. Matter of Dorsey, 7 Port. 293 (Ala. 1838).
30. The following cases recite that the due process limitation was procedural: Cohen
v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 (1863); Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa 208 (1861); Taylor v. Porter, 4
Hill 140 (N. Y. 1843); Embury v. Conner 3 N. Y. 511 (1850); Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa.
St. 86 (1847); State v. Maxay, 1 McMull L. 501 (S. C. 1837); State v. Simons, 2 Speers
761 (S. C. 1844). However there were some jurisdictions which treated due process as a
restriction upon arbitrary legislative excercise. Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 1 (N. C. 1833);
Bank of State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599 (Tenn. 1831); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59

(Tenn. 1836).
31. The trend probably began with Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1853), and
Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140 (1855) wherein the courts maintained that the
police power was subject to limitations. And in Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378 (1856)
it was plainly stated that due process was a substantive limitation upon arbitrary legislative exercise. Cf. Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188 (1925).
32. See note 34, infra.
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negroes equal rights of citizenship.P3 However, this interpretation was soon
questioned. One of the draftsmen8 4 of the Amendment revealed that no such
narrow limitation was intended and this contention is strengthened when considered in the light of the evolution of the scope of this term.s Subsequent
judicial interpretations have given to it the quality of a substantive limitation,
and such has become its accepted meaning 0
Modem state regulation of business began with Munn v. Illinoi3 7 decided
in 1877. Statutes, the result of the Granger movement, were passed in many
of the western states regulating the prices to be charged by grain elevators
whose owners were enjoying a virtual monopoly. 88 During an era which accepted competition as the summum bonum, and the theory that prices were determined by impersonal forces, it was recognized that state regulation would
be required where a situation existed which enabled prices to be arbitrarily
fixed. The United States Supreme Court upheld the power of the Illinois
legislature to regulate what was in fact a monopoly, and characterized the
business as one which could be controlled because it was "affected with a
public interest."3 9 The prevailing evil was the ability to fix arbitrary prices.
Failure to exercise a power raises the presumption that it never existed and the
decision was unfavorably commented upon by the press. 40 On the same day
the Court sustained a statute fixing railroad rates41 and precedent existed for
state control despite the Fourteenth Amendment which was given a substantive
42
interpretation. Seventeen years later the Supreme Court, in Brass v. Stoeser,
broadened the field by upholding a statute regulating grain elevators where no
33. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36 (1872). In this decision the Supreme Court defined the purpose and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment maintaining that its primary
purpose was to guarantee to the negro equal rights of citizenship. Accord: United States
v. Cruickshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U. S. 162 (1874).
34. Mr. Roscoe Conkling, who was a member of the committee which framed the
Fourteenth Amendment, in arguing the case before the United States Supreme Court, produced in court the unpublished journal of the committee to support his contention that the
Amendment was not intended solely to protect the negro. See Cushing, The Fourteenth
Amendment (1922) 20 MIcH. L. REv. 737, 743 n. 20.
35. See cases cited in note 31, supra.
36. See Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment (1909) 7 Mxcut. L.
Rav. 641; Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court (1927) 40
HARv. L. Rav. 943, 946-948.
37. 94 U. S. 113 (1877).
38. See Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on Nebbia v.
New York (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 401, 403. See also Hamilton, Affectation with a Public
Interest (1930) 39 YAr.x L. J. 1089.
39. The Court in rendering the decision applied the term "affected with a public interest," used before for a different purpose by Justice Hale in England, to support its conclusion. There is no doubt that the Court's conclusion constitutes historical error. See
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 149 (1877).
40. See N. Y. Times, March 29, 1877, wherein decision was characterized as being
mischievous and meddlesome and one which would drive foreign capital out of the country. See 9 Ros-'s NoTs oN U. S. R"PoRTs 510 (Rev. Ed. 1918).
41. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 (1877), upholding
the power of the state to fix railroad rates.
42. 153 U. S. 391 (1894).
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semblance of monopoly existed. But in this broad decision the seed of a
narrow limitation of the doctrine enunciated in Munn v. Illinois may be found.
The Court indicated, in explaining away the lack of a factual monopoly which

had existed in the Munn Case, that if the business fell within the class designated
as being "affected with a public interest" it might be regulated regardless of
the pertinent facts or proof of an abuse. 43 What businesses were "affected with
a public interest" received some semblance of definition in Wolff Packing Company v. The Court of Industrial Relations44 where the businesses which were
"affected with a public interest" were classified as follows: (1) those carried
on by virtue of a public grant; (2) inn-keepers, cabs and such which had been

controlled since early English common law; (3) those private businesses where
there is a presumption that the owner has granted to the public a use therein.
Regulation of the first two has never been questioned; constitutional issues

arise only in the question of the arbitrariness of the prices set 4

It is in the

last class that the power of control has been seriously questioned. Beginning
with the Wolff Packing Company Case where the states' power to regulate the
meat packing business was denied, control of the business of ticket brokers,40
employment agencies 47 and the ice business,48 was denied to the states. The
Court in each of these decisions seemed to have implied from the language in
the Brass v. Stoeser decision that a business must fall within the category of

businesses "affected with a public interest" before it could be controlled. To
the Court, "affected with a public interest" had become a conceptual term, a
43. Id. at 403, where the Court said that "great stress is laid upon exprEsions used in our
previous opinions, in which the business, as carried at Chicago and Buffalo, is spoken of as
a practical monopoly. . . When it is once admitted, as it is admitted here, that it is
competent for the legislative power to control the business of elevating and storing grain
...such power may be legally exerted over the same business when carried on in smaller
cities and in other circumstances." Between this decision and Munn v. Illinois 94 U. S.
113 (1877), the case of Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517 (1892), which substantially followed the Munn Case, was decided.
44. 262 U. S. 522 (1923). Prior to this decision the Supreme Court had upheld the
power of the states to regulate the rates of fire insurance companies. German Alliance
Insurance Company v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
45. Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920); Dayton-Goose Creek
Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924). See 2 COOLEY, CONsnrroTO.A. Lr-,=ATohzs (8th ed. 1927) 1301, n. 1.
46. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927). This decision represents the use of
the term "affected with a public interest" as a rule of exclusion rather than inclusion. It
seems to be predicated on the fact that theatre tickets are not necearies of life.
47. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928), holding that despite the existence of evils,
the state had no power to fix rates.
48. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932). The case involved the power
of the state to require a certificate of convenience before an individual or corporation could
engage in a business of manufacturing ice. The Court maintained that ice was not such
a necessary as would require control and also there %%as no question in regard to protecting the consumer. Prior to this decision the Court, in Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278
U. S. 235 (1929), held that a state had no power to regulate the prices at which gasoline could be sold. The Court insisted that if a business did not fall within the category
of one which is "affected with a public interest," it could not be controlled. Cf. O'Gorman
& Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931).

280
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condition precedent which must be satisfied before the state might interfere.04 o
Failure of a business to fall within this category was fatal regardless of whatever abuses might arise because of a lack of regulation. No standard was set
up to determine which private businesses fell within the class, but the size
of the business and the character of the commodity were important factors.50
These decisions are punctuated with the dissents of Holmes6 1 Brandeis " and
Stone, 53 denying that there is such a thing as a closed category of business and
insisting that the evil which would result from an unregulated business is the
criterion in the determination of whether such businesses should be controlled.
.Such was the general trend of the law involving state regulation of private
businesses prior to the Nebbia Case.5 4 In this decision the United States Supreme Court repudiated the theory that there is a closed category of business
which is "affected with a public interest."5 5 The immediate facts of the case
concerned the power of the Milk Board to fix a minimum price at which a
retailer could sell to a consumer. This Board had been established after a
thorough legislative investigation, and was granted certain powers as outlined
in the emergency statute. 56 Destructive price cutting had placed the farmer
in a desperate situation and was affecting a basic industry of the state. The
minimum price questioned was one of the methods calculated to wipe out the
49. See notes 46, 47, 48 supra. Under this theory, it seemed immaterial whether evils
might arise because of the lack of regulation; if the business was not "affected with a
public interest," regulation was not possible.

50. See notes 46, 48, sura.
51. Justice Holmes wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273
U. S. 418, 445 (1927) maintaining that the "affectation with a public interest" was nothing
more than a fiction. His view is political-if the legislature, representing the people, think
that regulation will benefit the public welfare, the Court should not question the wisdom
or the power of the legislature despite the fact that the Court might reasonably differ with
the wisdom, expediency or enforceability of the legislation.
52. See New State Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 280 (1932). He maintained that
if the relevant facts show that regulation is required for the public protection, the state
should have the power to regulate.
53. See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 359 (1928). Justice Stone argues against
the use of "affectation with a public interest" as a condition precedent to control, and
maintains that the evil would result from a lack of regulation is the criterion. The dissents
of justice Holmes, Brandeis and Stone represent the majority view in Nebbla v. New
York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
54. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
55. "It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a
public interest, and the function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged
regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or
discriminatory." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 536 (1934).
56. See N. Y. Legis. Doc. No. 59 (1933), setting forth the report of the Pitcher Committee in regard to the condition of the milk business in New York. The circumstances
reported were: (1) the milk business affected the health and prosperity of the state; (2)
the financial situation of the dairy farmer was desperate; (3) the low prices paid to the
farmer were due to unfair and destructive trade practices in the distribution of milk and
the instability of the milk business in general.
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evil.5 7 With a recognition of the normative force of existing facts the court
upheld the regulation and returned to the true interpretation of the Mfunn
decision.58 Decisions are subject to the dynamics of the economic order. It
is probably true that the economic theories behind the two statutes are the
antitheses of each other. In the Munn decision, the statute assumed that prices
were the result of impersonal forces and that competition was the sumvium
bonum; in the Nebbia decision, the indication was that competition as exercised

was not desired, and as a substitute prices should in part be determined by conscious human control. One statute was enacted to prevent the fixing of
arbitrary prices-the consumer was the beneficiary of the act;69 the other was
enacted to protect an industry and a livelihood-the farmer-producer was the
primary beneficiary of the act.6 o Despite the different economic theories behind the statutes, the decisions enunciate the same rule of law in their holding
that a state may regulate if such regulation is necessary to promote the economic
welfare of the state. An outstanding feature in the Nebbia Case is that the
court had before it facts, the result of a thorough legislative fact finding,"'
which indicated a basis for the statute and which enabled the court to determine
whether or not the act was a pure arbitrary measure.02 Also, the emergency
angle was not a factor in the decision, although it was a factual element
03
responsible for the enactment of the statute.
The Supreme Court indicated in the Nebbia Case that it would not interfere
57. This was one of the methods recommended by the Pitcher Committee in order to
mitigate the evil of price cutting. See New York Legis. Doe. No. 59 (1933).
58. The decision in the Munn Case was predicated upon the existence of a situation
creating a monopoly which enable the owners to fix arbitrary prices. However, the Court
attempted to further sustain the statute by referring to the "affected with a public interest" theory as used by Justice Hale in his treatise De Portibus Mars. The part of the
decision dealing with this term could probably be considered as nothing more than &ditunm.
59. In the Munn Case, the ability to fix prices would have been a detriment to those
dealing with the owners of the grain elevators. See JCOBson, Tnm DaVmopr-snx or
Amaucwa PoLAmc
THouGT-A DocumrnTAR H onRy (1932) c. 7 for the effect of
social changes upon the political and legal philosophy in the United States.
60. See N. Y. Laws, 1933 c. 158. While partly labelled as a health statute, the
primary purpose of the statute was the protection of the livelihood of the farmer. Hon.
Henry Epstein, Solicitor General of the state of New York, who was on the brief in the
argument of the Nebbia Case before the Supreme Court of United States, stated in N. Y.
S. B. A. BuLL. (1934) at 442 that the "motivation of the act may have well been the
poverty of the farmer-producer and the threat to his existence in under payment; the
desire to bring him a greater return, a living income from his tiresome labors.'
61. See the brief of the Attorney General of the State of New York in the Nebbia Case
citing the legislative fact finding, thereby giving the Court an insight into the actual conditions existing in the milk industry in New York.
62. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 518-19 (1934) wherein the Court refers to
the exhaustive fact finding by the legislature indicating that regulation. was neceary.
63. See N. Y. Laws, 1933, c. 158 reciting the existence of the emergency. The Court
made a slight reference to the fact that it was an emergency measure but there is no
reference to this factor in the ultimate conclusion of the Court. The emergency is important only as a factual element which would bring those businesses, where there would
not have been any necessity for control in previous years, under the control of the state
to-day.
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with the economic policy of a state which was reasonably directed toward the
promotion of the public welfare.6 The state recovery acts represent an effort
by the legislatures to effect a recovery from the present economic depression.
While the regulations under these acts are not the result of a long legislative
fact finding, the "denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation."6 5 To determine what economic theory lies behind
this paternalistic attitude of the states, resort must be had to the National
Industrial Recovery Act. As the Act indicates it is primarily a recovery
measure. Whether it was designed to effect recovery by an elimination of competition in favor of "monopoly," or to give competition an opportunity to work
is a matter of debate.60 Attempts have been made to place purchasing power
in the hands of those who will buy by means of large public expenditures and
64. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934): "So far as the requirement of duo
process is concerned ... a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare."
65. Dissent of Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311
(1932).
66. See Gulick, Some Economic Aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933)
33 COL. L. REv. 1103. E.g., there are two bills before the Senate at the present time S. 2199
provides that it shall be lawful to make contracts reasonably regulating competition, while
S. 2211 provides for the supplementing of existing laws against combinations in restraint of
trade.
Aside from questions of power, the desirability of the recovery acts must be considered.
Such an inquiry must first cover the purpose. Undoubtedly the ultimate purpose was
recovery and the next intermediate purpose revolves about two alternatives. Shall recovery
be achieved by the elimination of competition and gradual obliteration of laissez-faire In
favor of "monopoly"; or on the other hand does the National Industrial Recovery Act
represent the following: BERLE AND Mw xs in THE MODERN CoPoRAOx

AND

PaIVATE

PROPERTY (1933) have shown that the country's economic and social existence has become
the domain of two hundred corporations. LALER, CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL I
A?, micA ImusRY (1931), shows that almost every industry has one or a few dominating
enterprises which serve as leaders in every respect, and this condition developed despite
the anti-trust laws and the Federal Trade Commission. The ability of these more heavily
endowed enterprises to carry on trade at a loss over a longer period than the smaller enterprise was forcing the latter out of business with consequent unemployment. Therefore
the theory was that by providing for the fixation of prices and a uniform wage and hour
scale, the smaller businesses would be able to compete with the larger enterprises; a
tendency which was directly contrary to the first alternative set out above In regard to
the obliteration of competition. Furthermore, by establishing a new plane of competition,
the superior bargaining power of the larger enterprises would be diminished, e.g., discounts.
Presumably the essence of recovery was immediate employment and it would seem, therefore, that the latter alternative would be the best means of achieving that result. The
efficacy of the choice of methods, the codes of fair competition, is, as viewed in the light
of the comments of the proponents and opponents of these regulations, still the subject
of much controversy. See B;GrA AxD RODMM, CuAI=ENGE To ThE N w DEAL (1934),
for a collection of articles attacking the administration; CoREY, TnE DEcL=E or AmErIcAN
CtPrrAzism (1934), for an analytical survey of present conditions; STOL0ERo AND ViNToN,
Ta EcONOMIC CoNsEQuENcxs or TnF N:v DEAL (1935)

(major failure of the New Deal

has been its timidity and hypocrisy in supporting labor); N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1934 at I
(Moley discusses the aims of industrial recovery) ; Richberg, Lega! Problems of the National
Recovery Administration (1933), 38 CoM. L. J. 682.
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the increase of wages and the shortening of hours of labor."7 Also it constitutes
an attempt to eliminate unfair methods of competition, competition carried on
by means of destructive price and wage cutting, by fixing prices, g wages and
hours of labor in the codes adopted by the industries.P The Nebbia decision
has been used to sustain the recovery acts.7o Undoubtedly the language in the
decision is suggestive enough to give good basis for the courts' upholding this
economic policy of the states. 7 ' But the language must be considered in the
light of the relevant facts. The Court was dealing with an economic policy
adopted only after a thorough legislative fact finding. The Court insisted that
the wisdom of the legislation is for the legislatures, but reserved to the courts
is the power of determining whether the means adopted satisfy the end and
purpose of the statute 72 This limitation, however, would seem to continue to
preserve to the courts the power to prescribe the dominant policy.
Many of the courts have upheld the acts in the spirit of the experiment but
a closer scrutiny will probably be given to the future acts.Y3 The judiciary
67. See Gulick, Some Economic Aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933)
33 CoL. L. REv. 1103. N. Y. Times, May 7, 1933 at 1 (President Roosevelt agrees that
public works should be used to relieve unemployment); Richberg, Legal Problems of the
National Recovery Administration (1933) 38 Com. L. 1. 682.
68. Undoubtedly the government does not approve of direct price fixing. Price regulation has assumed the form of prohibition of selling below costs together with a price publishin list. Various methods have been used: (a) Open price filing-listing of prices with
some board or agency. Selling below such price filed constitutes a violation. See Bituminous
Coal Code, art. VI (4). (b) Basing points-a manufacturer must file a list of basic prices
for all standard products of the industry f.o.b. one of several designated shipping points;
see Iron & Steel Code, sect. E. (c) Minimum prices--only a few codes provide for a
uniform minimum price for the entire industry; see Petroleum Code, art. I1 (6). (d) All
the codes provide against selling below cost.
69. All the codes provide for a fixing of hours and a minimum wage. It is mandatory
under sect. 7 (a) to abide by these regulations when the President approves the code.
70. Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 8 F. Supp. 437 (1934) (price regulation by a
code does not violate the Constitution, citing Nebbia decision); State of Ohio ex rel.
Knepper (Ct. of Com. Pleas, Ohio, 1935) (recovery act constitutes valid police measure
to promote the public welfare, citing the Nebbia decision); Reams v. Dusha (Ct. of Com.
Pleas, Ohio, 1934); Haddon v. Standard Drug Co., Inc. (Va. Law & Equity, Ct. of Rich.
1934) (no closed class or category of business affected with a public interezt).
71. State regulation of business finds good constitutional support in the Nebbia decision since the Court indicated that a state may adopt whatever economic policy may be
deemed to promote the public welfare. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934).
However the reasonableness of the legislation may depend upon the individual economic beliefs of the nine justices. Also, it may be argued that the Nebbia decision may be distinguished on the ground that price regulation was necessary to protect the health of the
consumer. See Epstein, The Constitutional Significance of the New Yorh Milh Case (1934)
N. Y. S. B. A. BurLL. 437.
72. How far the courts will go in questioning the regulation by the states dep2nds upon
the interpretation of the statement of the Court that "the function of courts.., is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a

reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory."

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, at 536 (1934).

73. Decisions sustaining the recovery acts have been brief in the majority of the cases
indicating an inclination toward upholding the acts without a too thorough survey of

constitutional problems involved. See cases cited note 70, supra.
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probably will demand a more definite standard by which it may be able to determine whether the means adopted satisfy the purpose of the statutes. There is

an indication that even though one individual under a code is prevented from
obtaining a "fair return," that fact alone will not condemn the regulation as

arbitrary.7 4 The question also remains whether the upholding of a code for a
particular industry will be conclusive as to the constitutionality of the statute.
Under the argument that all businesses are interrelated and the approval of

the regulations in one industry affects business as a whole, it might be argued
that once a recovery act has been upheld, constitutional issues revolve about the
arbitrariness of ,the regulations and not whether in the first instance such
75
business could have been regulated.
Delegation of Legislative Power

Many of the federal and state courts have declared the state acts void on
the ground that they constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. 70
In view of the "Hot Oil" case, it is reasonably inferable that most of the state
acts will prove vulnerable on the ground of an undue delegation of legislative
power. 77 However, should a national act be reenacted which should satisfy the

complaint of the Court in the Oil Case, the following problems arise in connec-

-

74. See Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 8 F. Supp. 437, 440 (S. D. N. Y. 1934)
("The principle of regulation of price is fundamentally fair, even though there Is some
reasonable disregard in individual cases. Such disregard is inherent in any broad social
policy."). Cf. 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTzON;AL LIMITATiONS, (8th ed. 1927) 1301, n. 1.
75. This question apparently has not been raised. Since there is but one statute providing for the regulations it would seem that a decision upholding regulations under one
code may be conclusive as to the scope of the power.
76. Cox v. Dunbar (Superior Ct. of Calif. 1934) (administrative rules may be adopted
by reference but adoption of national act constitutes undue delegation); Reams v. Dusba
(Ct. of App. Ohio 1935); Cline v. Consumers Co-operative Gas & Oil Co., 152 Misc. 653,
274 N. Y. Supp. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (legislature has no power to delegate, and in no event
to a non-state created agency); Darweger v. Staats, 153 Misc. 522, 275 X.,Y. Supp. 394
(Sup. Ct. 1934) (violations are determined by something not in existence at the time of
enactment); aff'd Staats v. Darweger (N. Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1935) (no sufficient statement of the legislative policy); Gibson Auto Co. v. Finnegan (Wis. Sup. Ct. No.
223, 1935); cf. People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N. Y. Supp. 74 (3d Dep't 1934)
(law giving liquor board power to make rules and allowing it to determine what rules violated shall constitute a crime, void). The following courts have held that the recovery acts
are not void on the grounds that the legislature has unduly delegated its legislative power:
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 8 F. Supp. 437 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Ex Parte Lasswell,
36 P. (2d) 678 (Cal. 1934); Schneider v. Allen (Ct. of Com. Pleas Ohio 1934); Reams v.
Dusha (Ct. of Com. Pleas Ohio 1934), rev'd (Ct. of App. Ohio 1935); State of Ohio v.
Knepper (Ct. of Com. Pleas Ohio 1935); Stokes v. Newtown Creek Coal & Coke Co., 153
Misc. 821, 275 N. Y. Supp 290 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Sabatini v. Andrews, 276 N. Y. Supp.
502 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1934); Spaulding v. Kaminski, 153 Misc. 678, 276 N. Y. Supp.
663 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Medows v. Furrow (C. C. W. Va. 1934); Haddon v. Standard Drug
Co., Inc. (Va. Law and Equity, Ct. of Rich. 1934).
77. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935). The Supreme Court Indicated
that the power given to the President under the oil provision of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (709 C.) was too broad and constituted a delegation of legislative power. It
also intimated that a standard could not be found in § 1. Therefore, it might be argued
that the whole act constituted a delegation of power in allowing the President to proceed to
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tion with the state acts. All state constitutions provide for a separation of
powers and therefore in fact constitute a prohibition against undue delegation.7 8
Some states, also, prohibit the adoption of existing laws by reference7
In the
event that the National Industrial Recovery Act is reenacted, those jurisdictions
should not attempt to incorporate it by mere reference 8 0 The state acts
should embody a standard copied on the style of the national act, and it should
be provided that the codes approved by the President should constitute standards of competition within the state when filed with the secretary of state. 8 l
formulate rules and regulations for many of the industries. The adoption of thece codes
by the states would a fortiori constitute the adoption of more than mere administrative
rules. The state courts will no doubt give deference to the ruling of the Supreme Court.
Cf. Staats v. Darweger (N. Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1935); Reams v. Dusha, (Ct.
of App. Ohio 1935) (undue delegation of power, therefore state recovery act unconstitutional).
78. There is no direct prohibition against a delegation of legislative power, but all of the
state constitutions provide that the legislative power of the state ;hall be vested in the
legislatures. E.g., N. Y. Const. art. I § 1 provides that the "legislative power of this
state shall be vested in the Senate and Assembly." Cf. Barto v.Hlmrod, 8 N. Y. 483
(1853); Stanton v. Board of Supervisors, 191 N. Y. 428 (1903).
79. Approximately two-thirds of the states prohibit the adoption of existing laws by
reference. Comment (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. 601. E.g., N. Y. Const. art m § 17:
"Existing laws not applicable by reference.' The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent
the adoption of prior statutes into another statute so as to eliminate the poshibiity of a law
being adopted with which the legislature is not fully acquainted. People ex rel. N. Y. Elec.
Lines Co. v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593 (1888); People v. Lorillard, 135 N. Y. 285 (1892).
80. The following states have recovery acts which adopt the National Industrial Recovery Act by reference: Cal. Laws 1933, c. 1037; Col. Sess. Laws 1933, H. B. 67; II.
Laws 3d Spec. Sess. 1933, H. B. 162; N. M. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 18; Tex. Ist Spec.
Sess. 1933, H. B. 10; Va. Acts 1933, c. 61; Wash. Laws 1933, S. B. 92; W. Va. Laws 2d
Spec. Sess. 1933, H. B. 142; Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 16.
Two states provide for the filing of the codes with the secretary of state before they will
have the force of law. In these jurisdictions, incorporation by reference does not occur
unless the codes themselves constitute more than administrative rulings. N. Y. Laws 1933,
cc. 781, 783; N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 166; S. C. Acts 1934, n. 1135; three jurisdictions provide
that the governor may approve codes of fair competition. Ohio Laws 1933, H. B. 705; Utah
Laws 1933, c. 21; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 476. New Jersey originally enacted such a provision. N.
J. Laws 1933, cc. 369, 372. But this has been repealed. N. J. Lavws 1934, c. 37. Some
jurisdictions, while not providing for an adoption of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
suspend the anti-trust laws in relation to regulations under the codes. Kan. Laws 1933, H.
B. 2; Miss. Gen. Laws 1934, H. B. 349. One jurisdiction suspends a labor law. Masz.
Acts 1933, c. 347.
There is pending legislation providing for either the adoption or extension of some form
of the recovery acts in the following states: Cal. (S. 224; A. 113); CoL (S. 473); Conn.
(S.368; H. 546); Kan. (S. 210); Mass. (S.356; H. 1621); Neb. (H. 305, H. 303); N.
IL (H. 68) ; N. D. (S. 78) ; Ore. (H. 103) ; Pa. (H. 358) ; Utah (S.94; H. 98) ; W'is. (S.
44); Wyo. (S. 61). The following states have pending legislation providing for a repeal
of the state recovery acts: Ill. (L 3) ; W. Va. (S.50).
81. There is no objection to adopting the standards set up by Congress.. See In re
Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 612, 133 N. E. 453, 455 (1921); State v. Vmo
Medical Co. 121 Me. 438, 440, 117 Atl. 589, 590 (1922) ("we are not aware of any objection
on constitutional grounds to the adoption of legislative enactments of any existing definition
or standard enacted by Congress").

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

Under a valid federal act these codes would constitute merely administrative
rules and regulations although given the force of law.8 2 Since the purpose of
an administrative body is to make regulations pursuant to the act that gives
it the power, codes adopted subsequent to the act carry out the purposes of the
state acts when they are filed with the secretary of the state.8 3 Objections
may be taken on the ground that a representative of a different government
formulates these regulations,s4 and as such is proceeding under a standard set
up by Congress and not by the state legislatures. 85 By formulating state recovery act standards on the style of the federal standard, this objection should
lose its force and it could be argued that the President is following two identical
standards. If a standard has been set up, it should not be fatal if the regulations are made by a representative of a different sovereignty. 80
As to those states which do not prohibit incorporation by reference, the incorporation of the federal act would not violate any express provision of their
constitutions.8 7 However, if it referred to any amendments made by Congress
subsequent to the enactment of the state act, it would be void as to such. 88
But the reference to the automatic adoptions of the future regulations, the
codes, would not seem to violate any constitutional limitation, although some
courts have expressed doubts on this point.8 9
Objection to the state acts is also predicated on the ground that there is a
denial of due process of law since they do not sufficiently define what shall
constitute a crime. 90 The acts generally provide that the violation of any
provision of the codes shall be a misdemeanor punishable by fine. In estab82. Rules and regulations of the administrative bodies do not have the force of statutes
even though the legislature might give them the force and effect of laws. Schumer v.
Caplin, 241 N. Y. 346, 150 N. E. 139 (1925).
83. The purpose of any administrative board set up by the legislature, is to carry out the
purpose of the law by formulating rules in futuro.
84. The question should be immaterial whether the regulation is made by a state
.agency or a foreign agency; if it is an administrative regulation, it violates no constitutional prohibition. See Comment (1935) 33 MicH. L. R.v. 597, 601 setting forth the
adoption by the states of federal administrative determinations in those fields where the
national and state governments have pursued a common policy; e.g., federal narcotic laws.
85. In State v. Larson [10 N. J. Misc. 384, 160 Atl. 556 (1932)), the state aviation act
which purported to allow the state aviation commission to proceed under a standard set
up by Congress was declared void on this ground. Cf. Sweetland v. Curtis Airport Corp.
41 F. (2d) 929 (N. D. Ohio 1930).
86. See note 84, supra.
87. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 28 Ariz, 22, 235
Pac. 137 (1925); Cox v. Dunbar (Superior Ct. Calif. 1934); Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.
C. 158, 115 S. E. 202 (1922).
88. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 28 Ariz. 22, 235
Pac. 137 (1925) (void as to the attempt to adopt the standard of insurance as subsequently
adopted by New York); Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202 (1922) (cannot incorporate laws to be made in futuro by Congress).
89. Cline v. Consumers Co-operative Gas & Oil Co., 152 Misc. 653, 274 N. Y. Supp. 302
(Sup. Ct. 1934); Darweger v. Staats, 275 N. Y. Supp. 394 (Sup. Ct.. 1934).
90. Darweger v. Staats, 275 N. Y. Supp. 394 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (violations are determined
by something not in existence at time of enactment, and the definition of a crime is left
to a foreign agency).
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lishing a crime, a legislature must fix an ascertainable standard of guilt, so that
01
those subject thereto may regulate their conduct in accordance with the act.
In the recovery acts, however, the filing of the codes Will have established the
standard of guilt, and it is recognized that the legislatures may delegate the
power to9 2make rules and regulations and provide that violations shall constitute
a crime.

THE SATISFACTION o

GOLD CLAUSE OBLIGATIONS BY LEGAL TENDER PAPER.

Not until 1867 did anyone seriously litigate1 what Charles Pinckney meant
when he successfully urged upon the Constitutional Convention - that the document it was then formulating confer upon the Congress the power "To coin
money" and "regulate the value thereof." 3 During that year and those that
have followed, however, the Supreme Court of the United States on four occasions 4 has been called upon to declare what this government's founders contemplated when they incorporated this provision into the paramount law of the
land.5 Confessedly, numerous other powers delegated in terms to the national
91. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921); Connally v. General
Const. Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445 (1926); Champlain Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1931).
92. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 522 (1911). ("A violation of reasonable
rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the
Secretary, but by Congress. The statute, not the Secretary, fixes the penalty."). Accord:
Avent v. United States 266 U. S. 127 (1924); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.
S. 394 (1928); cf. Broadbine v. Inhabitants of Town of Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E.
607 (1903).
1. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1869), was frst argued before the United
States Supreme Court during the December term of 1867. It is scarcely necesary to remark that the question had already been determined in state courts as well as inferior
federal tribunals.
2. In the draft of the Constitution proposed by Mr. Pinckney tiere appeared a coinage
clause virtually identical with that ultimately adopted. See 1 Er.rxoT, Dmnum (2d ed.
1836) 184.
3. While other litigation, not unrelated to this grant of power, arose at substantilly
the same time and resulted in a line of decisions of which Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U. S.
229 (1868), may be regarded as the parent, it was considerably narrower in scope and
concerned chiefly an interpretation of the terms of the Legal Tender Acts, the Court
holding the provisions thereof were not intended to extend to contracts expreEsly made
payable in gold and silver coin.
4. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, Knox v. Lee,
Parker v. Davis, 79 U. S. 457 (1871); Juiliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421 (1884);
These last decisions are divided as follows:
Gold Clause Cases, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935).
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., United States et al. v. Bankers' Trust Co. et al.
(two cases), ibid.; Nortz v. United States, id. at 428; Perry v. United States, id. at 432.
For the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice M Reynolds, applicable to all the cases.,
id. at 419.
5. U. S. Co-,sr. Art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have the power . . . To coin money,
regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin... ..

